An Alternative Natural Deduction for the Intuitionistic Propositional Logic by Ilić, Mirjana
Bulletin of the Section of Logic
Volume 45/1 (2016), pp. 33–51
http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.45.1.03
Mirjana Ilic´1
AN ALTERNATIVE NATURAL DEDUCTION FOR THE
INTUITIONISTIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC
Abstract
A natural deduction system NI, for the full propositional intuitionistic logic,
is proposed. The operational rules of NI are obtained by the translation from
Gentzen’s calculus LJ and the normalization is proved, via translations from
sequent calculus derivations to natural deduction derivations and back.
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1. Introduction
It is well-known that sequent formulations of some substructural logics can
be obtained from Gentzen’s calculus LJ , by rejecting or restricting some of
the structural rules, whereas operational rules need not differ from the op-
erational rules that are given for intuitionistic logic in LJ (see [1]). On the
other hand, Gentzen’s natural deduction calculus NJ [3] doesn’t have the
similar property. Our motive in formulating natural deduction system NI
is to set up an intuitionistic natural deduction system, from which natural
deduction systems of some substructural logics can be obtained, by getting
the control over the discharge of assumptions, whereas operational rules
need not differ from the operational rules in NI (as for sequent calculi).
1This work is supported by the Ministary of Science and Technology of Serbia, grant
number ON174026.
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It is well-known that the natural deduction rule ∧ − I:
α β
α ∧ β
can be of one of the following forms:
Γ
...
α
Γ
...
β
α ∧ β
or:
Γ
...
α
∆
...
β
α ∧ β
,
where
Γ
...
α denotes a natural deduction derivation of α with open assump-
tions from Γ. Open assumptions are called the contexts of the rules, so the
rule on the left is usually referred to as a context-sharing rule and the rule
on the right, as a context-independent rule (Γ and ∆ which appear in the
later, may be different). We have the similar notion for the rule → −E:
α α→ β
β
.
For the plain intuitionistic logic, contexts of those rules are irrelevant,
therefore, in intuitionistic natural deduction calculi, operational rules are
either context-sharing, as e.g. in NJ [8], or context-independent, as e.g. in
Gentzen’s NJ and von Plato’s natural deduction [6]. On the other hand,
this is not the same in Gentzen’s sequent calculus LJ , where two types of
operational rules are present: the rule which corresponds to ∧− I, i.e. the
rule ∧− IS, is context-sharing and the rule → −IA, which corresponds to
→ −E, is context-independent:
∧ − IS :
Γ ⊢ α Γ ⊢ β
Γ ⊢ α ∧ β
→ −IA :
Γ ⊢ α β,∆ ⊢ Λ
α→ β,Γ,∆ ⊢ Λ
(Λ is either singleton or empty).
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In this paper we give a natural deduction system NI, with both types
of operational rules, context-sharing and context-independent ones. We
obtain them by a translation of Gentzen’s operational LJ-rules, into nat-
ural deduction. The idea of formulating natural deduction systems for
intuitionistic logic, by translating sequent calculi, is not new (see e.g. [5],
[6]). Actually, the technique employed here is substantially that given by
Negri and Plato in [5], [6]. However, sequent calculi in [5], [6] are with
context-independent rules only, unlike LJ , therefore our natural deduction
system differs from those in [5], [6].
Moreover, instead of usual assumptions, i.e. initial formulae α, we use
general assumptions, in the form of initial rules:
α, α1, . . . , αn
α
in NI. As a consequence, NI-derivations are free from vacuously dis-
charged assumptions, meaning that every formula which is discharged by
the application of some inference rule, really occurs in the upper part of
at least one initial rule in that derivation. Below, we give two derivations
of the formula α → (β → α). In the derivation on the left, we use initial
formulae, whereas in the derivation on the right, we use initial rules:
(2)
[α]
β → α
(→ I)
(1)
α→ (β → α)
(→I)
(2)
(1) (2)
[β], [α]
α
β → α
(→ I)
(1)
α→ (β → α)
(→I)
(2)
We note that, in the derivation on the left, the formula β is vacuously
discharged (we also say cancelled), by the application of the rule (→ I),
with the discharge label (1), unlike in the derivation on the right, where
the assumption β really occurs. Moreover, the initial formula α in the
derivation on the left, stands in for the derivation of α from α, i.e. for the
derivation
α
α
, therefore it acts as both, an assumption and a conclusion.
On the other hand, in the derivation on the right, every formula acts either
as an assumption or as a conclusion.
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It should be mentioned that the use of generalized assumptions, in
formulating natural deduction for intuitionistic propositional logic, is not
new. E.g., in the sequent-style natural deduction NJ, in [8], axioms are of
the form:
Γ, ϕ ⊢ ϕ.
However, our systemNI and NJ are different systems, as mentioned above.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the sequent
calculus formulation GI of the full propositional intuitionistic logic, with
the property that the structural rules of cut and weakening are admissible
in it. In Section 3, we present the natural deduction system NI. In
Section 4, we prove thatNI is sound and complete for the full propositional
intuitionistic logic. In the closing section we give some remarks.
2. Sequent calculus GI
Let L be a language of the propositional calculus with the propositional
constant ⊥ and the binary connectives →, ∧ and ∨. Formulae of L are
defined inductively, as usual. We shall use α, β, γ, ϕ, . . . as schematic
letters for formulae of L. As usual, ¬α can be defined as α → ⊥. Greek
capitals Γ, Π, Θ, . . . will denote finite (possibly empty) multisets (lists
without order) of formulae.
Sequents are expressions of the form Γ ⊢ γ.
GI has the following postulates:
Axioms:
Γ, α ⊢ α ⊥,Γ ⊢ γ
Structural rules :
contraction: weakening : cut :
Γ, α, α ⊢ γ
Γ, α ⊢ γ
(W)
Γ ⊢ γ
Γ, α ⊢ γ
(K)
Γ ⊢ α α,Π ⊢ γ
Γ,Π ⊢ γ
(cut)
Operational rules :
Γ ⊢ α Π, β ⊢ γ
Γ,Π, α→ β ⊢ γ
(→ l)
α,Γ ⊢ β
Γ ⊢ α→ β
(→ r)
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Γ, α ⊢ γ
Γ, α ∧ β ⊢ γ
Γ, β ⊢ γ
Γ, α ∧ β ⊢ γ
(∧ l)
Γ ⊢ α Γ ⊢ β
Γ ⊢ α ∧ β
(∧ r)
Γ, α ⊢ γ Γ, β ⊢ γ
Γ, α ∨ β ⊢ γ
(∨ l)
Γ ⊢ α
Γ ⊢ α ∨ β
Γ ⊢ β
Γ ⊢ α ∨ β
(∨ r)
There are some minor differences between GI and some other sequent
calculi for intuitionistic propositional logic, e.g. LJ [3], G2i [9] and G0i
[6]. However, all of them are mutually equivalent.
The admissibility of the rule of cut in GI, can be proved by a standard
cut-elimination procedure, via the elimination of the rule of multicut. I.e.,
instead of cut we eliminate the multiple cut rule of the following form:
Γ ⊢ α α, . . . , α,Π ⊢ γ
Γ, . . . ,Γ,Π ⊢ γ
(mcut)
Moreover, the rule of weakening is also an admissible rule in GI:
Lemma 1. Every cut-free GI-derivation can be transformed into a cut-
free GI-derivation of the same endsequent, in which no weakening occurs.
Proof: It is easy to show that weakening never needs to follow imme-
diately any other rule in a cut-free GI-derivation.
Definition. Cut-free GI-derivations with no applications of the rule of
weakening, will be called normal GI-derivations. ⋄
Corollary 2. Every GI-provable sequent has a normal GI-derivation.
3. Natural deduction NI
We formulate the natural deduction system NI, by a translation of axioms
and logical rules of GI into inference rules of NI.
First we consider the axioms of GI. The meaning of α,Γ ⊢ α, i.e. of
α, α1, . . . , αn ⊢ α (the multiset Γ = α1, . . . , αn is possibly empty) is that
from α, α1, . . . , αn we can derive α. In the natural deduction notation, this
is written as:
α, α1, . . . , αn
α
,
which is one of our initial rules of NI.
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The other axiom in GI is ⊥, α1, . . . , αn ⊢ γ, which gives another initial
rule of NI:
⊥, α1, . . . , αn
γ
.
The meaning of the rule (→ l) in GI is that if there is a derivation of α
from Γ and there is a derivation of γ from Π, β, then there is a derivation
of γ from Γ,Π, α → β. In the natural deduction notation, this is written
as:
α→ β
α→ β
Γ
...
α
Π, [β](1)
...
γ
γ
(→E)
(1),
which is the elimination of implication rule, denoted by (→ E) in NI.
With [β] we denote, as usual, the discharging of the assumption β. To
indicate what is discharged and where, we write the little number within
parentheses, here (1), next to the discharged assumption β and next to
the mnemonic symbol for the rule applied, (→ E). Those numbers will
be called discharge labels and they must be fresh in the derivation so far
constructed. We note that this rule is almost the same as von Plato’s
rule (⊃ E) in [6]. The only difference is due to our use of initial rules
instead of initial formulae, i.e. that instead of von Plato’s initial formula
α → β we use the initial rule
α→ β
α→ β
. This is the general formulation
of the implication elimination rule, and it differs from the corresponding
Gentzen’s rule, which is the special elimination rule. All other elimination
rules of NI will also be given in their general form.
The rule (→ l) is a two-premises context-independent rule. On the other
hand, the rules (∧ r) and (∨ l) are two-premises context-sharing rules.
To obtain the corresponding natural deduction rules, we need to assign
labels to assumptions, as in [4]. We shall call them the assumption labels.
Formulae with the same assumption label are treated as if they were the
same formulae. This means that when a formula with a label is discharged,
all formulae with the same label are discharged at the same time. We use
integers for assumption labels (to distinguish them from discharge labels,
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we write them without parentheses). The natural deduction formulation
of the rule (∧ r) is:
ΓN
...
α
ΓN
...
β
α ∧ β
(∧ I)
By the application of this rule, the corresponding formulae from Γ in the
derivation of α, and from Γ in the derivation of β, are assigned with the
same assumption labels. This is indicated by N in ΓN (if a formula from
Γ in the derivation of β, already has a label, assigned to it earlier in the
derivation, then, by the application of this rule, this formula gets a new
label, in order to equalize it with the label of its corresponding formula
from Γ in the derivation of α).
It should be noted that the use of assumption labels is not new in
formulating natural deduction systems. In fact, the use of labels is quite
standard in natural deduction systems of substructural logics (see e.g. [2]
where labelled natural deduction system for the implicational fragment of
the relevant logic R is presented, and [4], for the natural deduction system
for intuitionistic linear logic).
Natural deduction NI
Initial rules:
α, α1, . . . , αn
α
,
⊥, α1, . . . , αn
γ
,
where the multiset α1, . . . , αn is possibly empty. Formulae from the premises
of the initial rules will be called the assumptions.
Logical rules:
α→ β
α→ β
Γ
...
α
Π, [β](1), . . . , [β](1)
...
γ
γ
(→E)
(1)
Γ, [α](1), . . . , [α](1)
...
β
α→ β
(→ I)
(1)
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α ∧ β
α ∧ β
Γ, [α](1), . . . , [α](1)
...
γ
γ
(∧E)
(1)
1
ΓN
...
α
ΓN
...
β
α ∧ β
(∧ I)
α ∧ β
α ∧ β
Γ, [β](1), . . . , [β](1)
...
γ
γ
(∧E)
(1)
2
Γ
...
α
α ∨ β
(∨ I)1
α ∨ β
α ∨ β
ΓN , [α](1), . . . , [α](1)
...
γ
ΓN , [β](2), . . . , [β](2)
...
γ
γ
(∨E)
(1),(2)
Γ
...
β
α ∨ β
(∨ I)2
We note that there is no need to formulate the natural deduction rules
which correspond to the structural rules of cut and weakening, since it
is sufficient to consider normal GI-derivations. The remaining structural
rule, the rule of contraction, is implicit in natural deduction, in the form
of multiple discharge of assumptions.
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We give an example proof of a distribution law in NI:
[α∧(β∨γ)](5)
α∧(β∨γ)
[α∧(β∨γ)](5)
α∧(β∨γ)
[β∨γ](4)
β∨γ
1
[α](3),
2
[β](1)
α
1
[α](3),
2
[β](1)
β
α∧β
(α∧β)∨(α∧γ)
(∨I)
(∧I)
1
3/
[α](3),
4
[γ](2)
α
1
3/
[α](3),
4
[γ](2)
γ
α∧γ
(α∧β)∨(α∧γ)
(∨I)
(∧I)
(α∧β)∨(α∧γ)
(∨E)
(1),(2)
(α∧β)∨(α∧γ)
(∧E)
(3)
(α∧β)∨(α∧γ)
(∧E)
(4)
(α∧(β∨γ)) → .(α∧β)∨(α∧γ)
(→I)(5)
The use of general, instead of special elimination rules in natural de-
duction, allows us to define normal derivations as in [4], [6]:
Definition. A derivation is in normal form when all major premises of
elimination rules are conclusions of initial rules. ⋄
We note that every NI-derivation is in normal form.
4. Equivalence of GI and NI
GI and NI are equivalent, and with this we mean:
Theorem 3. For any formula γ, there is a derivation of ⊢ γ in GI iff
there is a derivation of γ with all assumptions discharged in NI.
Proof:We define a translation from a normalGI-derivation pi, of a sequent
⊢γ, to natural deduction, inductively according to the last rule applied.
The last applied rule in pi can be one of: (→ r), (∧ r) or (∨ r). Then
the translation is given as follows:
1.1.
pi1
α ⊢ β
⊢ α→ β
(→ r) 7→
pi1
[α](1) ⊢ β
α→ β
(→I)
(1)
1.2.
pi1
⊢ α
pi2
⊢ β
⊢ α ∧ β
(∧ r) 7→
pi1
⊢ α
pi2
⊢ β
α ∧ β
(∧I)
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1.3.
pi1
⊢ α
⊢ α ∨ β
(∨ r) 7→
pi1
⊢ α
α ∨ β
(∨I)
pi1
⊢ β
⊢ α ∨ β
(∨ r) 7→
pi1
⊢ β
α ∨ β
(∨I)
In each case of translation, we write sequent calculus derivation(s) in
the upper part, the rule in natural deduction notation and the conclusion
of that rule in the lower part. The sequent calculus derivation(s) in the
upper part will be called the sequent calculus segments of the translation,
noting they are the same as the corresponding sequent calculus derivations
given on the left-hand side of 7→. Those derivations will be translated in
the further steps of the translation.
The formula α from [α](1) ⊢ β in 1.1, will be an assumption, discharged
by the application of the rule (→ I), in a natural deduction derivation,
obtained by the translation. This is the reason why instead of α we write
[α](1) in 1.1., i.e. why we add brackets and the discharge label (1). In the
following translations, we shall use [Γ] to denote a multiset of bracketed
formulae, assigned with discharge labels.
Let Tr be a translation so far constructed and let one of its sequent
calculus segments be the segment S, which is given on the left-hand side
of 7→ below. If the last rule in S is an operational rule, then we have:
2.1.
pi1
α,Γ ⊢ β
[Γ] ⊢ α→ β
(→ r) 7→
pi1
[α](i), [Γ] ⊢ β
α→ β
(→I)
(i)
provided (i) is new discharge label in the translation so far constructed.
2.2.
pi1
Γ ⊢ α
pi2
Π, β ⊢ γ
[Γ], [Π], [α→ β](k) ⊢ γ
(→ l) 7→
7→
[α→β](k)
α→β
pi1
[Γ]⊢α
pi2
[Π], [β](i)⊢γ
γ
(→E)
(i)
provided (i) is new discharge label in the translation so far constructed.
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2.3.
pi1
Γ ⊢ α
pi2
Γ ⊢ β
[Γ] ⊢ α ∧ β
(∧ r) 7→
pi1
[Γ] ⊢ α
pi2
[Γ] ⊢ β
α ∧ β
(∧I)
2.4.
pi1
Γ, α ⊢ γ
[Γ], [α ∧ β](k) ⊢ γ
(∧ l) 7→
[α ∧ β](k)
α ∧ β
pi1
[Γ], [α](i) ⊢ γ
γ
(∧E)
(i)
provided (i) is new discharge label in the translation so far constructed.
We proceed similarly when the endsequent of pi1 is Γ, β ⊢ γ.
2.5.
pi1
Γ ⊢ α
[Γ] ⊢ α ∨ β
(∨ r) 7→
pi1
[Γ] ⊢ α
α ∨ β
(∨I)
We proceed similarly when the endsequent of pi1 is Γ ⊢ β.
2.6.
pi1
Γ, α ⊢ γ
pi2
Γ, β ⊢ γ
[Γ], [α ∨ β](k) ⊢ γ
(∨ l) 7→
7→
[α ∨ β](k)
α ∨ β
pi1
[Γ], [α](i) ⊢ γ
pi2
[Γ], [β](j) ⊢ γ
γ
(∨E)
(i),(j)
provided (i) and (j) are distinct and new in the translation so far con-
structed.
If the last rule in S is the structural rule of contraction, then we have:
2.7.
pi1
Γ, α, α ⊢ γ
[Γ], [α](k) ⊢ γ
(WE) 7→
pi1
[Γ], [α](k), [α](k) ⊢ γ
If S is an axiom, then we have:
3.1. [α](k), [α1]
(k1), . . . , [αn]
(kn) ⊢ α 7→
[α](k), [α1]
(k1), . . . , [αn]
(kn)
α
3.2. [⊥](k), [α1]
(k1), . . . , [αn]
(kn) ⊢ γ 7→
[⊥](k), [α1]
(k1), . . . , [αn]
(kn)
γ
.
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Our translation produces natural deduction derivations with discharges
fully formalized. On the other hand, the assumption labels which should
be assigned by the application of the rules (∧ I) and (∨ E) are missing.
However, they are not needed. Really, the purpose of assumption labels
in natural deduction derivations is to identify different occurrences of the
same formulae, in order to discharge all of them at the same time, but this
is guaranteed by our translation.
Thus, we have proved:
If pi is a normal GI-derivation of a sequent ⊢ γ, then its translation is
an NI-derivation of γ with all assumption discharged (and it is normal,
by our definition).
We now define the translation of an NI-derivation of a formula γ,
with all assumptions discharged, to a GI-derivation, inductively, according
to the last rule used. Multisets of open assumptions Π, Γ and Θ, which
appear in natural deduction derivations, are possibly empty.
If the last rule of the natural deduction derivation is (→ I), then we
have the following cases. If exactly one occurrence of α is discharged by
the application of the rule (→ I), then:
Π, [α](i)
...
β
α→ β
(→I)
(i) 7→
Π, α
...
β
Π ⊢ α→ β
(→ r)
(Note that if (→ I) is the last rule of our derivation, then Π is empty.)
On the right-hand side of 7→ we remove the discharge label (i) and
brackets in [α](i), to denote that α is the open assumption in the derivation
of β from Π, α.
If at least two occurrences of α are discharged by the application of the
rule (→ I), then:
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Π, [α](i), . . . , [α](i)
...
β
α→ β
(→I)
(i) 7→
Π, α, . . . , α
...
β
Π, α ⊢ β
Π ⊢ α→ β
(→ r)
(W),
where double line next to (W) denotes possibly several contractions (at
least one).
If the last rule is (→ E), then we have the following cases:
α→ β
α→ β
Θ
...
α
Π, [β](i)
...
γ
γ
(→E)
(i) 7→
Θ
...
α
Π, β
...
γ
Θ,Π, α→ β ⊢ γ
(→ l)
α→ β
α→ β
Θ
...
α
Π, [β](i), . . . , [β](i)
...
γ
γ
(→E)
(i) 7→
Θ
...
α
Π, β, . . . β
...
γ
Π, β ⊢ γ
(W)
Θ,Π, α→ β ⊢ γ
(→ l)
If the last rule is (∧ I), then we have:
Γ
...
α
Γ
...
β
α ∧ β
(∧I) 7→
Γ
...
α
Γ
...
β
Γ ⊢ α ∧ β
(∧ r)
(Note that we omit assumption labels.) If the last rule is (∧ E), then we
have the following cases:
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α ∧ β
α ∧ β
Γ, [α](i)
...
γ
γ
(∧E)
(i)
1 7→
Γ, α
...
γ
Γ, α ∧ β ⊢ γ
(∧ l)
α ∧ β
α ∧ β
Γ, [α](i), . . . , [α](i)
...
γ
γ
(∧E)
(i)
1 7→
Γ, α, . . . , α
...
γ
Γ, α ⊢ γ
Γ, α ∧ β ⊢ γ
(∧ l)
(W)
We can proceed similarly for the rule (∧ E)2.
If the last rule is (∨ I), then we have:
Γ
...
α
α ∨ β
(∨I)1 7→
Γ
...
α
Γ ⊢ α ∨ β
(∨ r); similarly for (∨I)2.
If the last rule is (∨ E), then we have the following cases:
α ∨ β
α ∨ β
Γ, [α](i)
...
γ
Γ, [β](j)
...
γ
γ
(∨E)
(i),(j) 7→
Γ, α
...
γ
Γ, β
...
γ
Γ, α ∨ β ⊢ γ
(∨ l)
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α ∨ β
α ∨ β
Γ, [α](i), . . . , [α](i)
...
γ
Γ, [β](j), . . . , [β](j)
...
γ
γ
(∨E)
(i),(j) 7→
7→
Γ, α, . . . , α
...
γ
Γ, α ⊢ γ
(W)
Γ, β, . . . , β
...
γ
Γ, β ⊢ γ
(W)
Γ, α ∨ β ⊢ γ
(∨ l)
If the last rule is an initial rule, then we have:
α, α1, . . . , αn
α
7→ α, α1, . . . , αn ⊢ α
⊥, α1, . . . , αn
γ
7→ ⊥, α1, . . . , αn ⊢ γ.
We note that the sequent calculus derivation obtained by this transla-
tion is normal, thus we have proved:
If d is an NI-derivation of γ with all assumptions discharged, then its
translation is a normal GI-derivation of ⊢ γ.
Having the translations from normal GI derivations to NI-derivations
and vice versa, we can now complete the proof of our Theorem. Let pi be
a GI-derivation of ⊢ γ. Then there is a normal GI-derivation pin of γ.
By the translation defined, the translation of pin is an NI-derivation of
γ, with all assumptions discharged. Conversely, let d be an NI-derivation
of γ, with all assumptions discharged. Then its translation is a (normal)
GI-derivation.
Corollary 4. In an NI-derivation of γ with all assumptions dis-
charged, each formula in the derivation is a subformula of γ.
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5. Some final remarks
We note that in the formulation of the Theorem 3, we use a closed NI
derivation, rather than saying that there is a derivation of γ from Γ iff the
sequent Γ ⊢ γ is derivable. The reason for this is the implicit treatment
of the rule of contraction in NI. Due to that, only a contraction whose
contraction formula is active, in a sense that it is a side formula of an oper-
ational rule in a sequent derivation, can be expressed in natural deduction.
In an arbitrary derivation of Γ ⊢ γ, we can guarantee that every contraction
formula is active, only when Γ is empty.
NI-derivations are normal, by the definition. As a consequence, they
are not closed under composition (it is clear that a composition of normal
derivations need not be a normal derivation). In spite of that, we can prove
the following Closure Lemma, indirectly, via a proof of cut-elimination
for the calculus GI.
Closure Lemma. If there is a derivation of α from Γ in NI and there is
a derivation of β from α, . . . , α,∆ in NI, then there is a derivation of β
from Γ, . . . ,Γ,∆ in NI.
Proof: Let D1 be a derivation of α from Γ and let D2 be a derivation
of β from α, . . . , α,∆ in NI. We use the translation given in the proof of
the Theorem 3, to translate D1 and D2 into normal GI-derivations
pi1
Γ ⊢ α
and
pi2
α, . . . , α,∆ ⊢ β
. Every contraction in pi1 and pi2 is obtained by a
translation of an operational rule with multiple discharge of assumptions.
This means that every contraction formula in pi1 and pi2 is active.
Then, by eliminating multiple cut in:
pi1
Γ ⊢ α
pi2
α, . . . , α,∆ ⊢ β
Γ, . . . ,Γ,∆ ⊢ β
(mcut)
we obtain a normal GI-derivation pin of Γ, . . . ,Γ,∆ ⊢ β. This derivation
is also with active contraction formulae, only (the elimination procedure
does not need to produce contractions with inactive formulae). This is
crucial for our translation from a sequent calculus derivation of a sequent
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Γ, . . . ,Γ,∆ ⊢ β to a natural deduction derivation of β from the multiset of
open assumptions Γ, . . . ,Γ,∆.
The translation from a sequent calculus derivation, of a sequent Γ ⊢ γ,
to a natural deduction derivation of γ, from the multiset of open assump-
tions Γ, is given inductively, as in the proof of the Theorem 3, with only
difference that sequent-formulae without discharge label may appear here
(they are denoted by Θ). E.g.:
1.1.
pi1
α,Θ ⊢ β
Θ ⊢ α→ β
(→ r) 7→
pi1
[α](1),Θ ⊢ β
α→ β
(→I)
(1)
1.2.
pi1
Θ ⊢ α
pi2
Θ ⊢ β
Θ ⊢ α ∧ β
(∧ r) 7→
pi1
Θ ⊢ α
pi2
Θ ⊢ β
α ∧ β
(∧I)
2.2.
pi1
Γ,Θ1 ⊢ α
pi2
Π, β,Θ2 ⊢ γ
[Γ], [Π], [α→ β](k),Θ1,Θ2 ⊢ γ
(→ l) 7→
7→
[α→ β](k)
α→ β
pi1
[Γ],Θ1 ⊢ α
pi2
[Π], [β](i),Θ2 ⊢ γ
γ
(→E)
(i)
2.6.
pi1
Γ, α,Θ ⊢ γ
pi2
Γ, β,Θ ⊢ γ
[Γ], [α ∨ β](k),Θ ⊢ γ
(∨ l) 7→
7→
[α ∨ β](k)
α ∨ β
pi1
[Γ], [α](i),Θ ⊢ γ
pi2
[Γ], [β](j),Θ ⊢ γ
γ
(∨E)
(i),(j)
2.7.
pi1
Γ, α, α,Θ ⊢ γ
[Γ], [α](k),Θ ⊢ γ
(WE) 7→
pi1
[Γ], [α](k), [α](k),Θ ⊢ γ
3.1. [α](k), [α1]
(k1), . . . , [αn]
(kn),Θ ⊢α 7→
[α](k), [α1]
(k1), . . . , [αn]
(kn),Θ
α
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By this translation we obtain an NI-derivation of β from Γ, . . . ,Γ,∆.
Finally, natural deduction calculi of some substructural logics can be
obtained from NI, in a way we obtain their sequent calculus formulations
from GI. E.g., by rejecting the rule (W) in GI, we obtain a contraction-
less logic whose natural deduction system can be obtained from NI by
forbidding multiple discharge of assumptions. Or, by restricting the axioms
in GI to:
α ⊢ α and ⊥ ⊢ γ
we obtain a weakening-less logic, whose natural deduction system can be
obtained from NI by restricting initial rules to rules of the following forms,
only:
α
α
and
⊥
γ
.
The former is the BCK logic and the later one is the distribution-less
relevant logic. The problems of similar nature are discussed also in [7],
however, on the basis of the calculi which are different from ours.
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